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Promoting Global Agricultural Growth and Poverty Reduction 
Maros Ivanic and Will Martin 
Development Research Group, The World Bank 
ABSTRACT 
Constraints on resources, growth in demand, and a slowdown in agricultural productivity raise 
concerns that food prices may rise substantially over the next decades. The impacts of such 
higher prices on the poor and the required mitigating policy responses to this problem remain 
unclear. This paper uses a global general equilibrium model, projections of global growth and 
microeconomic household models, to project potential implications for incomes, food 
production and poverty. We find that higher agricultural productivity would generally lower 
poverty,  with different impacts depending where the productivity growth occurs, while 
protection policies that reduce imports would generally raise poverty.     
Key words: poverty, growth, projections   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
There is widespread concern that food prices may rise substantially in the coming decades 
because of a combination of increasing population, land and water constraints, increasing 
food demand per person; potential increases in demand for biofuels; and climate change 
(Evans 2009; Fischer, Byerlee and Edmeades 2009; Msangi and Rosegrant 2009). As shown 
by van der Mensbrugghe, Osorio-Rodarte, Burns and Baffes (2009), these factors could result 
in substantial increases in food prices, with potentially adverse implications for poverty 
(Ivanic and Martin 2008).  
One response to this concern is to argue for agricultural market price support and protection 
as a means of stimulating output and reducing the dependence of particular countries on 
imported food (Taylor 2008). Another is to focus on the potential for increasing productivity 
as a means of raising food output without necessarily raising prices. The approach of 
focusing on productivity improvements—particularly in developing countries—has the 
potentially important benefit that it can be a powerful force for poverty reduction in 
developing countries (Datt and Ravallion 1998; de Janvry and Sadoulet 2002). While the 
evidence on a slowdown in agricultural productivity is mixed (Fuglie 2008; Alston and 
Pardey 2009), there is considerable evidence that total factor productivity growth in 
agriculture was higher than in the rest of the economy during the period of the green 
revolution (Martin and Mitra 2001). Informed commentators also believe that there are 
scientific possibilities for substantial further increases in productivity (Fischer, Byerlee and 
Edmeades 2009). There is also strong evidence of serious under-investment in research on 
agricultural productivity, as evidenced by very high rates of return on government 
investments in research and development (Alston and Pardey 2000).  
In this paper, we try to address comprehensively the issues of the projected growth on 
poverty and the role of agricultural policies aimed at promoting further reduction in poverty. 
We first consider a baseline scenario of global growth with agricultural productivity growing 
at the same rate as the whole economy. Under this scenario, we examine the likely 
implications for poverty in developing countries of changes in incomes and food prices. We 
then explore a policy of increased investment in agricultural research and development that 
leads to increased food production.  As an alternative, we examine the consequences of a 
protectionist policy with the aim of raising domestic agricultural prices and production.   In 
the next section of this paper, we consider the issues of global growth, agricultural  
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productivity and poverty in more detail. Then, we turn to the model used for the analysis. In 
the third section, we discuss the scenarios used, while the fourth section contains results.  
2.  BASELINE PROJECTIONS OF GLOBAL GROWTH 
Considerable effort has been focused on projecting world population in the coming decades. 
Because population growth is likely to continue at a relatively high rate over this period, and 
because the impact of a one percent change in population on food demand is much higher 
than the impact of a one percent increase in real incomes, projections of global population are 
central in global projections of food demand. Some population projections, such as those 
prepared by the United States Census Bureau are based on careful analysis of drivers of 
population growth such as fertility, migration and mortality (Mulder, 2002). The projections 
of the USCB are especially valuable because they have been calculated for all economies.  
Increases in consumer incomes—especially for relatively poor consumers whose diets are 
diversifying away from basic staples to higher-protection foods, such as meats and dairy 
products—can also contribute to increases in overall demand for food.  These increases in 
income depend heavily upon changes in total factor productivity and factor endowments. For 
example, the study of Poncet (2006), takes into account various assumptions of the diffusion 
of technology among countries, labour force accumulation and estimates of savings rates to 
produce long-run projections of GDP, labour  and productivity growths for a number of 
countries.   
Changes on the supply side—especially those involving agricultural productivity and land 
use—also need to be considered. While some studies suggest a slowing growth of agricultural 
productivity, e.g. Alston et al (2009), others, such as Fuglie (2008), conclude that agricultural 
productivity growth remains strong.  In the next section, we consider the various implications 
of higher agricultural productivity on agricultural output, prices and poverty. 
On the supply side, sectorally neutral total factor productivity raises agricultural output more 
rapidly than demand, because the income elasticity of demand for basic foods is very low. If, 
however, increases in income are associated with capital deepening, where the capital stock 
grows more rapidly than output, then another factor comes into play—the Rybczynski (1955) 
effect. Increases in the stock of capital relative to labour and output can be expected to create 
pressure for resources to move into more capital-intensive sectors, and out of labour-intensive 
sectors such as traditional agriculture. A number of studies have found these effects to be  
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substantial, particularly in the case of capital-intensive growth in East Asia (Martin and Warr 
1993; Gehlhar, Hertel and Martin 1994). 
3.  AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY, PRICES AND POVERTY 
The impact of agricultural productivity on poverty has historically been a source of some 
controversy. Higher productivity can be expected to lower food prices—either at national or 
global level, depending upon whether countries are open to trade in agricultural products. 
And such declines in prices can be expected to benefit net consumers, and particularly the 
poorest, who spend around three-quarters of their income on staple foods (Cranfield, Preckel 
and Hertel 2007). However, many have expressed concern about the potential adverse 
impacts of lower commodity prices on the earnings of farmers, and those who earn their 
incomes as agricultural labourers. As Matsuyama  (1992) has pointed out, this is unlikely to 
be a problem when considering a change in agricultural productivity in a single, small, open 
country. Higher productivity in the agricultural sector of an open economy is likely to 
stimulate output from the sector as the increased profitability of the sector causes resources to 
be pulled in and output to rise through the combined effect of higher output per unit of input, 
and greater input use.  
In a closed economy, by contrast, output expansion is likely to be small because of low price 
elasticities of demand for basic agricultural products. Productivity-induced shifts in the 
supply curve cause large declines in prices, which cause producers to reduce their allocation 
of inputs to the sector. Under these circumstances,  employment in a sector benefiting from 
technical progress is likely to decline. Even stronger concerns for employment have been 
raised about productivity growth deriving from higher labour  productivity in agriculture. 
Clearly, these concerns apply much more heavily in closed economies than in open ones for a 
country’s own technical change, and are more of an issue for global technical change than for 
technical change at the country level. 
Datt and Ravallion (1998) examined the impacts of agricultural productivity growth in India, 
referring to the controversy that had raged as to whether higher agricultural productivity 
would be an important source of poverty reduction. They found, using econometric methods, 
that higher agricultural productivity (proxied through increases in yields) would be expected 
to reduce poverty substantially in India, partly due to the higher output of small farmers; 
partly because of lower food costs to net buyers of food, and partly through increases in wage 
rates for labour sold outside the farm firm.  In a subsequent article, de Janvry and Sadoulet  
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(2002) concluded, using stylized computable general equilibrium models, that higher 
agricultural productivity would lower poverty in the developing countries of Africa, Asia and 
Latin America, although the channels of effect would differ between regions, with direct 
income impacts of agricultural productivity growth dominating in Africa; indirect agricultural 
employment impacts in Asia; and linkage effects with the rest of the economy in Latin 
America. Minten and Barrett (2008) recently examined this question for Madagascar, taking 
advantage of more specific information about the rate of productivity growth at the local 
level. Like Datt and Ravallion (1998) , de Janvry and Sadoulet (2002) and Montalvo and 
Ravallion (2009), they find higher yields lead to poverty reductions. 
The implications of higher food prices for poverty are much less likely to be favourable, 
especially in developing countries. Higher prices for food raise the cost of living of poor 
consumers (Ivanic and Martin 2008). Further, the benefit that they provide to producers is 
related not to their output level—as in the case of productivity growth—but to their net sales 
out of the household. Since many poor farmers in developing countries are net buyers of 
food, increases in the price of agricultural goods are likely to hurt—rather than help—many 
poor farmers. The increase in the price of food (or other goods if taxes on other goods are 
raised to finance subsidies) is also a potential source of loss to poor people. Since few 
developing countries are likely to be able to raise sufficient taxes from other parts of the 
economy to pay output subsidies on their agricultural output, and since protection is likely to 
be partly motivated by a desire to increase food self-sufficiency, we focus on protection 
provided through import duties on imported goods. 
4.  MODEL 
4.1. Global Model 
Our global simulation is based on the latest (version 7 pre-release  5) GTAP data that 
describes the state of the world economy in 2004 including the levels of output, trade flows 
and protection for 57 commodities. We carry out our simulation using the latest GTAP model 
(Hertel, 1997; www.gtap.org). In order to reduce the number of calculations, we use an 
aggregated version of the model that contains the global geographical regions defined by the 
World Bank. These regions are presented in Figure 1. With respect to commodities, we 
aggregated 34 non-agricultural and non-food GTAP commodities into five categories relevant 
for this work: agricultural farm output (split into 37 commodities), energy, non-durables, 
durables and services. We preserved all food-related GTAP sectors in the global model, and 
in some cases we even split those sectors into additional sectors using FAO data on  
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production, prices and trade, and the recently developed MSplitCom software by Mark 
Horridge.  
<<Figure 1 about here>> 
Because most of our simulations relate either to long-term changes, such as improvements in 
output productivity, or gradual changes, such as changes in tariffs, we consider a long-run 
closure that allows complete flexibility of employment of capital and labour and limited 
flexibility of land use. To maintain consistency with the forward-looking nature of our 
simulation, we also double the standard GTAP elasticities governing the level of substitution 
between trade partners to allow for countries to substitute among the sources of their imports. 
The resulting model includes substantial differentiation of products between domestic and 
imported goods. Increases in productivity of a particular good have different impacts on its 
domestic consumer price depending upon the share of the good exported, which influences 
the total elasticity of demand for the domestic product, and the share of imports in domestic 
goods, which influences the impact of a decline in the price of the domestic good on the 
average consumer price of that good. 
4.2. Poverty assessment model 
Our model of poverty assessment is based on the household survey datasets collected at the 
World Bank for a range of developing countries. These surveys allow us to observe 
consumption, production and input use choices of individual households. We use the recent 
household surveys from twenty developing countries that span the developing world (Table 
1).  
<<Table 1 about here>> 
We used our set of surveys to obtain information on the annual expenditures and incomes of 
the households as well as the revenues and costs of any family-operated business. The 
information on household consumption, including any own-produced consumption, was 
separated  into seven broad categories: 37 agricultural (food) products, non-durables, energy 
goods, durables, services, financial expenses, and taxes and remittances paid by the 
household.  
Household incomes were also differentiated into wage income, financial income, transfers 
and remittances received by the household. The revenues and costs of any family-operated 
business were similarly classified using the same categories (i.e. agricultural sales, labour 
expenses, energy consumption etc.)   
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In the model, we assume that a household consumes a set of goods and derives utility which 
can be represented by an indirect utility function   which depends on the household's 
money income    and the vector of prices  . For given prices, the household's income 
includes labour income   and the profit from the household business  , which depends  
on the output prices while the price of the underlying fixed factors (such as the household's 
own land and capital) are assumed to exhaust the profits of the business. 
We define a money measure of the change in households' welfare   resulting from a 
price change as the difference between the change in profits   and labour income  , 
and the change in the cost of achieving the original level of utility  , following the 
change in the vector of prices of factors and consumption goods  . We can write:  
(1)   
Using a Taylor series expansion, we obtain a second-order estimate of the change in the cost 
of utility as 
(2)  , 
where   is the initial level of expenditure,   is a matrix of compensated demand elasticities, 
 is a vector of expenditures on individual items and   is a vector of percentage changes 
in prices. The calculation of matrix   is shown in Appendix A. 
On the supply side, we express the change in profits following a change in prices using a 
Taylor expansion: 
(3)  ,  
where   is a matrix of own and cross-price elasticities, the vector   is the observed initial 
vector of the values of inputs and outputs. It is important to note that   in this evaluation 
refers to the proportional change in effective prices, i.e. inclusive of the effects of changes in 
productivity on effective prices.  
In our model, we estimate and use the elasticity estimates for a three-level combination of 
two CES functions that determine and the household’s agricultural output, and a Constant 
Ratio of Elasticities of Transformation, Homothetic (CRETH) function that distributes this 
output across commodities. The calculation of the matrix of input demand and output supply 
elasticities is documented in Appendix B. We specified the elasticities of supply in the 
household model for broad consistency with the elasticities in the macro-model.   
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Finally, we calculate the change in labour income   as  
(4)  ,  
where   is the observed labour income. Our treatment assumes that the total amount of 
labour supplied by the household is fixed while the quantity supplied to the household's own 
business varies.  
Having obtained a change in the income for each household, we then calculate the change in 
the effective per-capita income. To account for different sizes of households, we use the size 
elasticity of the cost of living of 0.6 estimated by Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995). The poverty 
lines used in our calculations, reported in Table 1, were calculated using our household 
surveys in conjunction with the published poverty rates at a $1.25-a-day poverty line.
1  
5.  SCENARIOS 
5.1. Projections 
Using projections described in the second section, we formulated a baseline scenario. As is 
evident in Table 2, these projections imply some noticeable differences between the growth 
rates of population and of the labour  force at the regional level because of changes in 
dependency ratios.  With respect to agriculture, we consider two options: a low growth 
scenario, where agricultural productivity grows at the same rate as other sectors, and one with 
rates of productivity growth one percentage point per year higher. The higher-growth 
scenario involves global-average rates of agricultural TFP growth that are broadly in line 
with Fuglie’s projections of growth rates in agricultural TFP (Fuglie 2008). 
<<Table 2 about here>> 
While the population projections we use are comprehensive, covering 227 countries and 
territories, the projections of labour, capital and GDP growth by Poncet (2006) are less so, 
covering 107 countries or about 83 percent of the world population. Only five countries over 
50 million people were missing from the projections: Burma, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Russia and 
Nigeria. Where necessary, we used estimates for neighbouring countries to fill these gaps. 
The aggregate estimates of GDP growth for the regions used in our model are reported in 
Table 2.  
                                                       
1 We used the PovCalNet web-based tool to obtain the latest estimates of the poverty rates at 
$1.25-a-day poverty line definition.  
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In our baseline scenario we assume that growth in agricultural productivity is equal to that in 
the rest of the economy. This assumption in most cases also implies a substantial reduction in 
the growth rate of agricultural productivity—a notion supported by some recent research. For 
example, Alston et al (2009) suggest a decline in the global productivity growth for grains 
from 2.4 percent in the period 1960–1990 to 2.1 percent in the period 1990-2005. Because the 
observed global agricultural productivity growth of 2.1 percent per year is markedly larger 
than that in our baseline assumption of 0.6, we think of our sector-neutral-productivity-
growth scenario as a lower-bound scenario assuming a sharp deterioration from past rates of 
agricultural productivity growth. In our projections, we have not explicitly considered the 
role of demand for food for biofuels, but this could raise the total demand for food 
substantially. 
5.2. Possible policy responses 
Our primary policy response scenario involves improvements in agricultural productivity.  
We firsts consider changes in agricultural productivity globally, and then consider the 
impacts of increases in agricultural productivity in developing countries alone. This 
experiment is important because the policy decisions that influence agricultural productivity 
in developing countries are made by a different set of actors from those influencing 
productivity growth in the industrial countries. The international institutions and donors 
involved in the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research are much more 
important for developing countries, as are policy makers in national research institutes in 
developing countries, and the national policy makers involved in decisions about the adoption 
of new technologies. Once decisions are made to commit  resources to improvements in 
agricultural productivity in developing countries, another important set of decisions that we 
investigate are those about the allocation of productivity-enhancing resources to different 
commodities, and extending the improvements in technology to different groups of 
producers, with the smaller producers frequently being more difficult to reach than the larger, 
more commercial farmers. 
6.  RESULTS 
6.1. Baseline scenario 
Our baseline projections are intended not as forecasts but as a plausible backdrop against 
which to examine policy alternatives. The results for outputs and real prices presented in 
Tables 4 and 5 appear to be consistent with the consensus that there will need to be 
substantial growth in agricultural output over the next forty years to meet increasing demand.   
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<<Table 3 about here>> 
As reported in Table 3, our projection scenario involves an increase in the global output of 
basic agricultural products (indexed over production) of about 130 percent.  The projected 
growth rates of output vary considerably by product and by country in response to different 
demand and supply conditions for each product. While some products, such as poultry meat, 
have large increases in output in response to high income elasticities, others such as sorghum 
appear to grow rapidly because of demand patterns in regions with rapid population growth, 
rather than in response to changes in real incomes.  
Under our baseline scenario of uniform productivity growth in agricultural and non-
agricultural total factor productivity growth, the prices of many foods rise substantially, with 
the average value of farm output increasing by over 115 percent. Prices rise more for some—
frequently surprising—products  consumed in regions with relatively rapid demand growth, 
such as plantains, whose price increases by over 180 percent. The price of processed food 
behaves quite differently from that of raw products, with a price increase of only 14 percent 
overall because of increasing productivity in the processing sector. As a consequence, the 
overall increase in food prices at the household level is 48 percent.  
6.2. Possible policies 
We undertake counterfactual analyses of different policy alternatives relative to our baseline. 
The macro impacts of these changes on outputs and real prices are given in Tables 4 and 5. 
For a global increase in farm productivity of 1 percent per year, we find that agricultural 
output increases by about 180 percent, rather than the 130 percent observed under the 
baseline. This relatively modest increase in the rate of agricultural productivity growth 
sharply reduces the increase in prices of farm output, with the average output price rising by 
only 5 percent, rather than 116 percent. The price of processed foods declines by almost two 
percent in response to productivity growth in both primary agriculture and food processing, 
and the overall index of food prices rises by a modest 1.4 percent. These results highlight the 
fundamental importance of agricultural productivity growth for world food prices.  
<<Table 4 about here>> 
The third section of Tables 4 and 5 examines the impact of higher productivity in agriculture 
in developing countries only. This scenario results in larger increases in output in developing 
countries than the global agricultural productivity scenario but, not surprisingly, smaller 
global increases in output than the global agricultural productivity scenario. A key  
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consequence, evident in Table 4, is a much larger increase in food prices than under the 
global agricultural productivity scenario.  Global farm output prices rise by 31 percent, much 
more than the increase under the global productivity scenario. This increase is much smaller 
than the price increase of 116 percent under the baseline, highlighting the importance of 
agricultural productivity in developing countries as a group not just for their own 
performance, but for global market outcomes. The changes in food prices in developing 
countries are shown in ‘Developing column.’ These are generally broadly in line with those 
for the world as a whole, and involve increases averaging 31 percent.  
<<Table 5 about here>> 
In Table 5 we also report the changes in domestic prices relative to the CPI following the 
implementation of the protection scenario. In this scenario, we increase import duties on 
agricultural products in order to reduce imports by fifty percent. Because of the different 
initial import patterns across regions, different changes in protection are needed to achieve 
this goal. For those regions that represent the largest importers, such as South Asia and East 
Asia, significant levels of protection are required which increases the domestic price of 
agricultural output by 67 and 138 percent, respectively. Other regions require significantly 
lower protection which reduces imports more without raising the domestic prices much. 
<<Table 6 about here>> 
To understand the implications of our global and developing-country policy scenarios at the 
household level, we consider the impacts of price changes, wage changes and productivity 
changes on incomes in our baseline sample. We report the country-level and the average 
changes in poverty for the total population as well for rural households. The overall poverty 
impacts of our scenarios are shown in Table 6. The first set of columns of the table shows the 
original poverty rate (at 1.25 USD per day per person) as reported in each sample country. 
We list both the nation-wide poverty rates and those for rural poverty.  
The next set of columns shows the poverty impacts of the policy scenarios as a percentage 
point  change from the original rate. An annual one-percent improvement in total factor 
productivity in agriculture between 2010 and 2050 lowers poverty in all but two of our 
sample countries, with an average rate of reduction of 5.4 percentage points. The two 
exceptions—Albania and Nigeria—differ from others for reasons which we explain further 
later.   
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In the pair of columns in Table 6, we consider the case where only developing countries 
benefit from improvements in agricultural productivity.  A key feature of this simulation is 
that the average reduction in poverty is essentially the same as for a global increase in 
agricultural productivity. This is because most of the benefits of an increase in productivity 
remain with the country that achieved an increase in its own productivity. Some of these 
benefits accrue directly to the producers, who benefit from both higher output per unit of 
input and from a higher effective price of output, which creates incentives for them to expand 
their output. Further gains accrue from lower prices of food to consumers, and from factor 
market linkages.  
The third pair of columns in Table 6 shows the impacts on poverty of a move towards greater 
self-sufficiency in developing countries. This is implemented by increasing tariffs to a level 
that halves the current value of imports. This increase turns out to raise poverty in all but one 
country, Nepal. While many farmers are poor, many of these producers are actually net 
consumers of agricultural products, and hence likely to lose, rather than gain, from higher 
food prices. The increases in poverty average 2.4 percentage points. These increases in 
poverty are mitigated to some degree by the responses of households, which expand their 
output and reduce their consumption of food.  
<<Table 7 about here>> 
To understand this poverty reduction, we further decompose it in Table 7 with respect to 
individual sectoral impacts. The sixth column of Table 7, for example, shows that the average 
reduction in poverty by 5.4 percentage points in the high agricultural productivity growth 
scenario is mainly caused by the impact of the agricultural prices on consumption—which 
result in an average reduction in poverty of 5.6 percentage points. The second most important 
impact appears to come from rising wages for labour sold off-farm, which lower poverty by 
an additional 3.0 percentage points. On the other hand, the largest poverty-increasing impact 
appears to come from the increase in the price of other consumption by 3.0 percentage 
points—a change linked to the increase in wage rates. 
The impact of price and productivity changes in primary agriculture on producers is generally 
negative in productivity increasing scenarios: the reason for this is that factor productivity at 
the local level translates into smaller increases in effective output prices than the global 
reduction in output prices. As a consequence, farmers who are net sellers of agricultural 
products often lose out from reductions in the prices of these goods which are not  
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compensated by increases in their effective output prices. This is an illustration of the famous 
‘treadmill’ problem in agricultural research, where some producers that do not benefit from 
an innovation are made worse off by the decline in prices resulting from the innovation. 
However, it is very important to note that while higher global productivity hurts farms' 
incomes through lower prices, these prices help all consumers making the net poverty 
impacts poverty-reducing. 
Using the type of decomposition of Table 7, we are now in the position to explain the strange 
case of Nigeria and Albania, the two countries where the poor appear to lose out from the 
higher productivity gains scenario. As it turns out, these two countries lose for similar 
reasons: in both Albania and Nigeria, the poor consume significant amounts of services and 
nondurables, and energy in Nigeria, whose prices rise relative to the CPI, hurting the poor 
directly. In addition to that, the agricultural producers in Albania are less factor-intensive, 
gaining less from improved total factor productivity in agriculture and, as a consequence, 
they lose disproportionately more from the ‘treadmill problem.’  
Our finding that increases in agricultural productivity are, in most cases, an important source 
of poverty reduction is in concert with those of Montalvo and Ravallion (2009) that have 
shown that increases in agricultural yields were key drivers of poverty reduction in China in 
the period of 1983–2001. Similarly, Minten and Barrett (2008) have found a link between 
improved agricultural efficiency through lower prices and higher wage incomes on poverty. 
While our approach lacks the verification associated with econometric approaches, it does 
allow much greater flexibility in the specification of types of technical change, and provides 
greater ability to track the impacts through channels such as changes in the prices of services. 
6.3. Role of agricultural productivity in poverty reduction 
The poverty results of the three scenarios presented in this section suggest the  raising 
agricultural productivity may have an important role in poverty reduction. Once a decision 
has been made to commit resources to agricultural R&D, a number of important decisions 
about the allocation of these resources must be made. Should, for instance, research be 
focused on staple foods for domestic consumption. How much effort should be devoted to 
extending findings to the smallest—and possibly least easy-to-access producers?  
To investigate this matter further, we calculate poverty impacts for a set of higher agricultural 
productivity scenarios—similar to the one presented earlier—where we raise agricultural 
factor productivity one commodity at a time. As in the previous experiments, we calculate  
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poverty impacts for each scenario following  the changes in prices and productivity as 
observed in the CGE model. Because we are also interested in the distributional impacts of 
the raised productivity, for each scenario we calculate not only the overall poverty impact of 
raising a productivity in a  particular commodity, but also another set of impacts if we 
assumed that only some farms receive the benefit of higher productivity. More specifically, 
for each scenario we assume that a certain portion of the smallest farms does not benefit at all 
from higher agricultural productivity, and we further assume that these farms are only 
affected by the changes in the prices. 
<<Figure 2 about here>> 
Because of the computational complexity of calculating all sets of poverty impacts, we first 
identify those agricultural commodities that have the greatest potential of reducing poverty 
through their direct impacts on farmers' effective output prices. We calculate these impacts by 
assuming a 100 percent output productivity gain and then calculate the result of that change 
only for poverty reduction. Additionally, we calculate these impacts for different values of 
technology adoption among the smallest and poorest households. We present these results in 
Figure  2  which identifies the top seven commodities with the greatest poverty reducing 
potential at the global level. Looking at the figure, we can see that a 100 percent increase in 
the output productivity of rice has the greatest direct impact on poverty, reducing it by about 
2.7 percentage points. However, when the rate of adoption drops to 0.8—which means that 
only the top 80 percent of farms by size adopt the new technology—the poverty reducing 
effect begins to decline When the adoption rate drops to zero, all poverty impacts naturally 
disappear for all commodities. Figure 2 makes another interesting point by showing rank 
reversal with regard to the rate of adoption: while rice seems to be most poverty reducing 
with a 100-percent adoption rate, its effect is superseded by that of vegetables if adoption rate 
falls below 50 percent. 
In our final analysis of the importance of individual commodity productivity gains and the 
adoption rates, we use a set of simulations similar to that of higher agricultural productivity 
growth, except that we raise productivity for each commodity one at a time. We choose two 
commodities to analyze the comprehensive poverty impacts of raising agricultural 
productivity and its level of adoption: rice, which represents a commodity which has been 
identified in our earlier exercise as having high potential for direct poverty reduction, and 
wheat, which appears to be linked little directly to poverty reduction through providing its 
producers with higher effective prices.   
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<<Table 8 about here>> 
To help with the analysis, in Table 8, we present a set of impacts of raising productivity in 
both of these commodities for a range of adoption rates. In this table, we show poverty 
impacts of raising global total factor productivity by 1 percent over the period of 40 years for 
rice and wheat. For each adoption rate, we present a decomposition of the poverty results 
with respect to the differential impacts of the changes in agricultural and food prices and 
productivity on the consumers and producers. We also include a column ‘other impacts’ 
which contain the rest of the impacts such as changes in wages and prices of other goods 
which play little role in this experiment. Similarly to our earlier decomposition in Table 7, the 
impacts of improving global agricultural technology are favourable  for the poor through 
lower prices; they are unfavourable to the producers who face significant drops in the market 
price only partially compensated by their own effective output price gains. Finally, the sign of 
the rest of the impacts is small and ambiguous and it depends on the particular production 
structure.  
Table 8 is particularly illuminating in showing the interplay of two important components of 
poverty reduction through higher agricultural productivity: first, we can see that a 
commodity, such as wheat, may show little change in its effective output prices, but it may 
still have a considerable impact on poverty through favourable price impacts; in such a case, 
the rate of adoption plays little role in the overall poverty reducing impacts. Second, we 
observe that for some commodities, for example rice, the adoption rate is vital because a 
significant portion of the benefit to the poor comes from the benefits to producers of higher 
productivity. 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this study we investigated various drivers of poverty change in the coming decades. More 
specifically, we considered various types of growth, such as growth in population, labour, 
capital and productivity, and modelled the impacts of these patterns of growth on poverty.  
Our baseline simulation—involving uniform rates of technical progress across all sectors— 
involves substantial increases in prices of agricultural commodity prices. When, however, we 
allow for agricultural productivity growth rates one percent above those for the rest of the 
economy, these price increases are essentially neutralized.  
Consistent with the findings in the econometric literature, we find that raising global 
agricultural productivity has a favourable impact on poverty reduction. However, our analysis  
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also shows that nearly all of the positive impacts come from the favourable reductions in the 
cost of food consumption; the direct impact of improved agricultural productivity is often 
negative for farmers who get trapped in the ‘treadmill’ problem when their own productivity 
improvement is insufficient to offset the negative impact of falling producer prices. 
If developing countries respond to the comment climate of concern about food security to 
raise protection on agricultural commodities, the implications on poverty are likely to be 
unfavourable—even though farmers benefit from increased food prices on their output, net 
consumers—many of whom are also farmers—suffer even more in terms of poverty 
measures. 
In our work we also addressed the issue of identifying specific crops with the greatest 
poverty-reducing potential through improved productivity, and the issue of the importance of 
adoption of this improved technology by the smallest farmers in order to realize the gains in 
poverty reduction. We find that rice, vegetables and maize have the greatest direct impact on 
poverty through higher productivity and higher effective output prices. However, we also 
demonstrate that strong poverty reduction may come from other commodities, such as wheat, 
whose improved productivity benefits consumers indirectly through consumer prices more 
than the producers through higher profits.  
Finally, our work shows that while it highly desirable that improvements in agricultural 
productivity be extended to the smallest farmers, it turns out that the overall impact on 
poverty changes is often not very sensitive to the adoption rate of the new technology by the 
smallest farms: this is especially true for those commodities whose main benefit is derived 
through favourable price impacts, such as wheat. In several other commodities, for example 
rice, the adoption of the improved productivity by the smallest farmers appears to be 
relatively important. 
Much more work needs to be done to address many of the questions raised in this paper. The 
results presented  refer only to very broad scenarios of productivity growth across regions and 
commodities. Many decisions about resource allocation must be taken for individual 
countries—or even regions within countries—and the results of decisions in these contexts 
may be quite different. In particular, improvements in productivity at the individual region 
level are much less likely to have many of the offsetting effects on commodity prices that are 
experienced at the global level. A much wider country coverage is also required to obtain  
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results that are representative for the developing world as a whole. The analysis in this paper 
is intended as only a first step towards addressing these important issues.  
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APPENDIX A: DERIVING THE MATRIX OF COMPENSATED DEMAND ELASTICITIES WITH CDE 
PREFERENCES 
For comparability with the macro model, we use the Constant Difference of Elasticities  
(CDE) specification to characterize consumer demand. Following Hanoch (1975), we define 
a matrix of compensated elasticities   for CDE preferences as : 
(A.1)  ,  
when  , and 
(A.2)  ,  
when  , where   is the vector of CDE substitution parameters and   is the vector of 
consumption shares. 
For consistency with the macro model, we used the previously estimated values of   from the 
parameter file accompanying the GTAP database.  When only regional estimates were 
available, we assigned those values to all countries included in the region so that, for 
example, the parameter values estimated for Western Africa were applied to Côte d'Ivoire 
since no country specific estimate was available for that country.  
The values of   were obtained directly from the household survey data by calculating the 
observed consumption shares for each commodity relative to total consumption. This vector 
of consumption shares was therefore calculated for each household, meaning that each 
household was assigned slightly different elasticities of substitution using the formula 
presented above. It is important to note that the observed differences in the matrices of 
compensated price elasticities were assumed to be solely the result of the differences in prices 
that each household faced in its consumption decision and not differences in household 
incomes. 
APPENDIX B: CALCULATION OF THE INPUT/OUTPUT PRICE ELASTICITIES FOR  A CES–CES–
CRETH COMPOSITE PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
The production system used in this work is designed to obtain consistency with the response 
elasticities in the macro model; while maintaining the theoretical restrictions on household 
behaviour; and tracking the impacts of price and productivity changes on household welfare. 
It allows for the fact that farm households have production activities that frequently involve a 
significant number of commodities; that use material inputs; and that demand both family and 
hired labour.   
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The specification used involves a combination of CRETH and CES functions. At the bottom 
level, a household firm combines its fixed inputs (land, capital) with the mobile inputs 
(labour) in a CES production function. This value-added mix is then combined with inputs in 
another CES production function into a total output capacity. The output is finally distributed 
into individual agricultural products through the CET output function.  
The top-level CRETH function can be described by the following system of equations 
(A.3)  - ,  
where   is the output of product   with price  ,   is the output capacity with price  .   
is the positive elasticity of substitution. The zero profits condition for this nest means that the 
value of all outputs equals the value of output capacity:  where   is the elasticity-
weighted share of output devoted to good  :  . 
A CES function links the output capacity to the level of  value-added composite   with price 
 and inputs   with price   and the negative elasticity of substitution  : 
(A.4)   and   
The zero-profit condition again requires that  , where   is the share of inputs 
in output and   is the share of value-added. 
The value-added composite is produced using fixed   and mobile factors   in another CES 
sub-nest with the negative elasticity of substitution  .  
(A.5)   
(A.6)   
With the zero-profit condition represented by  , where  is the share of the 
fixed factor in the value-added and   is the share of the mobile factor. 
In our application, we assume that a household firm is a price taker in its output, input and 
variable factor market. The fixed input is assumed to belong to the household and its shadow 
price is adjusted to assure zero profits of the firm while its quantity is fixed ( ).  
Our goal is to fill in the matrix   of cross-price elasticities of the production quantities 
which we seek to express as a linear combination of elasticities of substitution contained in 
the production structure. For the sake of the illustration of cross-price output elasticities, we 




(A.7)   
(A.8)     
 
 
The values of the production elasticity matrix were calculated using the formula above. The 
values of   and  were obtained from the GTAP parameter file. The values of top-level 
output substitution parameters  for agricultural commodities were estimated from the global 
GTAP model, in which we randomly perturbed output taxes for all commodities, allowing us 
to measure the level of substitution of outputs with respect to the changes in relative prices of 
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Table 1: Household surveys included in this study 








Albania  Living Standards Measurement Survey  2005  1,671  1,447  0.8  0.9 
Armenia  Integrated Survey of Living Standards  2005  6,815  1,728  10.6  14.5 
Bangladesh  Household Income-Expenditure Survey  2000  7,440  5,040  40.2  46.1 
Cambodia  Household Socio-economic Survey  2003  14,984  11,990  50.5  59.7 
Cote d'Ivoire  Enquete Niveau de Vie des Menages  2002  10,798  5,819  23.3  29.3 
Guatemala  Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida  2006  13,686  7,878  12.6  17.2 
Malawi  Second Integrated Household Survey  2004  11,280  9,840  73.9  77.2 
Mongolia  Household Income and Expenditure Survey  2002  3308  1,457  22.4  23.6 
Nepal  Nepal Living Standards Survey II  2002  5071  3,655  55.1  67.0 
Niger  Enquete National sur Le Budget et la Consommation des Menages  2007  4,000  2,084  65.9  83.5 
Nigeria  Nigeria Living Standards Survey  2003  19,121  14,481  64.4  70.2 
Pakistan  Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey  2005  15,453  9,213  22.6  26.4 
Panama  Encuesta de Niveles de Vida  2003  6362  2,944  9.4  18.2 
Peru  Encuesta Nacional de Hogares  2007  22,201  8,639  7.9  17.6 
Rwanda  Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey  2005  6,900  5,280  76.6  88.2 
Tajikistan  Living Standards Measurement Survey  2007  4644  2,984  21.5  22.0 
Timor-Leste  Poverty Assessment Project  2000  1,800  1,098  52.9  64.8 
Uganda  Socio-Economic Survey  2005  7,425  5,726  51.5  58.3 
Vietnam  Household Living Standard Survey  2004  9,188  6,938  21.4  26.4 
Zambia  Living Conditions Monitoring Survey  2002  4,166  2,090  61.9  59.4 
Source: Authors' database 
 
Table 2: Projected growth rates and total growth between 2010 and 2050 in the baseline scenarios (in pct) 
  Population  Capital  Labour  GDP  Implied TFP productivity growth 
Developed  0.2  2.4  0.2  2.3  1.3 
East  Asia   0.2  5.6  0.3  4.7  1.9 
Europe & Central Asia  -0.1  2.1  0.3  1.8  0.7 
Latin America  0.7  1.8  0.7  1.6  0.4 
MENA  1.0  2.9  1.1  2.8  0.6 
South Asia  0.9  4.5  0.9  4.5  2.2 
Sub-Sahara Africa  2.0  2.0  1.6  1.7  0.2 
Total  0.7  2.8  0.6  2.6  — 
Sources: US Census Bureau, Poncet (2006) 
 
Table 3: Overview of global output changes 
 
  Baseline  Higher agric growth  Higher agric growth 
developing 
  World  Developing  World  Developing  World  Developing 
Farm output  126.9  121.7  179.1  183.1  166.0  205.1 
Fishing and forestry  249.1  276.6  274.8  303.2  270.7  298.7 
Processed food  124.6  94.7  154.6  164.0  145.7  157.2 
All food  126.0  112.9  164.7  178.9  154.6  185.8 
Source: Authors' calculations 
 
Table 4: Overview of global price changes (in pct, deflated by global CPI) 
  Baseline  Higher agric 
growth 
Higher agric growth 
developing 
  World  Developing  World  Developing  World  Developing 
Farm output  115.6  111.9  4.8  12.8  31.0  31.4 
Fishing and forestry  8.2  5.4  17.0  26.4  15.2  22.2 
Processed food  14.0  13.5  -1.8  -0.6  3.3  3.6 
All food  48.3  63.3  1.4  8.0  13.5  19.2 
Source: Authors' calculations    
 
Table 5: Regional price impacts of the protection scenario (relative to baseline) 










Farm output  138.2  3.2  2.0  67.4  3.2 
Fishing and forestry  -25.9  -0.8  -0.3  -23.0  -2.8 
Processed food  21.5  1.4  1.1  -1.9  0.5 
All food  102.6  3.2  1.7  49.7  4.1 
Source: Authors' calculations   
 
Table 6: Country level poverty impacts (relative to the baseline)  
  Higher agric growth 
developing 




Albania  1.0  0.4  0.0 
Armenia  -2.0  -1.8  0.3 
Bangladesh  -16.0  -14.4  9.3 
Cote d'Ivoire  -3.8  -4.7  0.6 
Guatemala  -7.0  -6.4  0.7 
Cambodia  -3.0  -3.8  2.6 
Mongolia  -3.9  -3.6  0.2 
Malawi  -12.1  -11.7  0.4 
Nepal  -4.4  -4.4  -0.8 
Nigeria  2.6  0.7  -0.1 
Niger  -2.3  -2.6  0.7 
Pakistan  -13.8  -12.3  22.4 
Panama  -2.4  -2.3  0.1 
Peru  -2.0  -2.0  0.2 
Rwanda  -2.4  -2.1  0.1 
Tajikistan  -7.6  -7.0  0.7 
Timor-Leste  -10.8  -9.7  6.2 
Uganda  -7.0  -7.1  0.1 
Vietnam  -4.8  -6.2  2.8 
Zambia  -6.7  -6.6  0.8 
Average  -5.4  -5.4  2.4 
Source: Authors' calculations 
 
Table 7: Decomposition of the sources of poverty change 
    Raw agriculture  Processed food  Fishing and forestry  Other  Wage  Total 








































World  -5.6  1.5  -0.5  0.2  0.3  -0.3  3.0  -1.1  -3.0  -5.4 
SSA  -6.2  1.2  0.1  0.0  0.5  -0.1  3.8  -1.2  -1.9  -4.0 
LAC  -3.9  1.3  -0.8  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  -0.8  -3.8 
SAR+EAP  -5.3  1.7  -0.4  0.1  0.4  -0.6  3.6  -1.8  -5.2  -7.6 


































  World  -4.5  0.5  -0.3  0.1  0.3  -0.2  2.3  -0.9  -2.6  -5.4 
SSA  -5.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.4  -0.1  2.8  -0.9  -1.6  -4.2 
LAC  -3.2  0.7  -0.6  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  -0.1  -0.6  -3.6 
SAR+EAP  -4.3  0.6  -0.2  0.1  0.3  -0.6  2.8  -1.5  -4.4  -7.3 


























  World  2.4  -2.1  -0.3  -0.1  -0.2  0.3  -1.3  1.2  2.5  2.4 
SSA  0.9  -0.4  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  0.0  -0.5  0.2  0.2  0.3 
LAC  0.4  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.4 
SAR+EAP  5.5  -5.6  -0.8  -0.3  -0.5  0.9  -3.1  3.1  6.8  6.1 
ECA  0.2  -0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.2  0.3 
Sources: Authors' calculations 
 
Table 8: Decomposition of the poverty impacts of improved agricultural productivity in rice and wheat 
  Rice  Wheat 
  Agriculture and food  Other 
impacts 
Agriculture and food  Other 
impacts  Adoption rate  Consumers  Producers  Consumers  Producers 
1.0  -0.46  0.11  0.01  -0.28  0.11  -0.02 
0.8  -0.46  0.12  0.01  -0.28  0.11  -0.02 
0.6  -0.46  0.14  0.01  -0.28  0.11  -0.02 
0.4  -0.46  0.18  0.01  -0.28  0.12  -0.02 
0.2  -0.46  0.23  0.01  -0.28  0.12  -0.02 
0.0  -0.46  0.34  0.01  -0.28  0.13  -0.02 
Source: Authors' calculations 
 
 
Figure 1: Regions defined and used in this work 
 
 
Source: The World Bank 
  
 
Figure 2: Relationship between agricultural innovation and poverty reduction for a different level of innovation adoption 
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